Nycle, within the framework I provide, the decisions of the big banks to pursue their risky loans fits in nicely. I argue that the distortions of the Fed caused the banks to jump headfirst into the bubble, which turned out to be a bad idea. My "walls of text" explain exactly why the bankers did this. To call this financial crisis "isolated" is a terrible way to look at it, because you exclude potentially damning information which distorts your conclusions. I find it odd that you call this analysis "unrealistic", considering I have shown the historic and current statistics that correlate very nicely with what I have said - and contradict your own assertions.
Keep in mind - I'm not defending the market participants, I'm defending the market. I am the one who is advocating that these "bad" bankers should be allowed to fail accordingly - and you are the one supporting their continued existence in the financial industry. I'm not sure how this one is being blamed on the "failure" of the markets when the markets clearly have not been allowed to function.
Seeing as you no longer choose to participate in the discussion, though, I will also cease arguing over the past (even though as the creator of this topic, I see no reason as to why this has gone "off-topic"). Instead, I will take my conclusions - and use them to make some predictions about what is going to happen - I will even apply my analysis to the events of the past few days to show how it all fits.
I've finally come to understand the tenets of the "new" plan that was hastily put in place - the "historic" bailout that Congress approved is now a memory, not only was it useless (as I said it would be), but even the Treasury Secretary himself has openly abandoned the plan (however, the new wave of powers that the Fed/Treasury have received are very alive and very well).
The "new" plan is centered around the "nationalization" of the major banks. Instead of buying up the bad mortgages, the Treasury is merely going to flood their reserves with capital. This has a few implications and presents a few new conclusions.
First - the Fed is now monetizing all forms of debt. Not just bonds or securities - but even loans themselves. This literally means that the Fed can directly act as a bank in-of-itself. This allows the Fed to inject money into the banks without overtly "creating" money, though money is created and thus inflation will continue. This is because the Fed, in the short-term, will merely wire money electronically to banks - virtual money that will float around in cyberspace for some time, until a consumer withdraws money and the bank gives them cash - newly printed cash.
Paulson sat down with the major banks and told them he was purchasing stock in all of them. This allows, once again, the Treasury/Fed to inject money (via stock purchases) without overtly creating money. But the second implication is that these banks are now under close government control - an issue I will return to shortly. In the meantime, the way the Fed is doing this is by "purchasing" bonds from the Treasury, who then use the new money given to them by the Fed to make these purchases.
The most interesting conclusion that can be seen is that now, the taxpayer will have no easy way of telling whether or not his money was spent wisely - and if he will, in fact, be "paid back" with "good investments". Previously, a consumer could merely check the value of their mortgage against the amount realized after it was purchased by the government, and then calculate the difference. But by instead injecting money directly into the reserves of the major banks, the Fed is further encouraging more loans - in short, doubling down on a bad bet.
The new plan is needed because it is doing what the free market has refused to do - that is, send new capital to these failing banks. If there was truly a way to profit from the selling-off of these non-performing mortgages - then free market actors would find the way. But with an infinite line of credit open to them, what incentives do these banks now have to efficiently liquidate their non-performing loans? The plan sets the economy up for an even greater risk of "moral hazard". One can argue the merits of "moral hazard" up until now, but at this point it's hard to argue that a new, greater risk now exists for bad decisions to be made. In 1999, when Fannie/Freddie began pursuing "subprime" loans, the risk of such a venture was mentioned - but the risk was that they would eventually be "bailed out" - not left to go bankrupt, but instead saved. To what extent this affected the next few years in the subprime market noone will ever be able to calculate - but to deny that it had an influence at all would be fairly poor judgement.
This plan will, in the short-run, cause harm to smaller, local banks. As per my analysis, the market is shifting capital away from the failing institutions and into these smaller, safer banks. This has a twofold effect: one, consumers' assets are truly safe, and two, the smaller banks are increasing their reserve capital, allowing them to make larger loans - which attracts new customers away from the failing banks. The process is allowing new competitors to enter the larger finance markets.
Rather than let this process happen, the government is throwing a wrench into the gears, by allowing the banks who made massive mistakes to continue... with an unlimited supply of credit. This means that the smaller banks - who could be gaining potential customers and increased reserves - are being prevented from growing. Aside from that, there is another potential threat - that, in order to remain competitive, these smaller banks might engage in the same type of poor loan-making activities that generate short-term profit at the expense of long-term risk. The sight of these larger banks being bailed out for their mistakes certainly does not reward the smaller banks for their patience and sound business decisions - and if their sound decisions do not reward them in the long-run with bigger market shares and thus profit, what incentive would they have to continue their less-profitable, but less risky activities?
In conclusion - the current plan will set up even small banks for a potential failure. In a free market, these banks would rise to the top because of their smart decisions, but that is not what's happening in the status quo.
Now, this is the short-term. In the long-term, I still see a massive failure of the major banks - in the form of "capital flight".
In the short-term, the big banks will gain alot of revenue - from the government, in the form of the bailouts and future programs - such as promises to guarantee future low-income home loans and other such risky ventures. Of course, the market has now learned of the true risk of such risky practices - and so capital will not return to these banks.
Instead, the capital will flow into banks that are much safer, much more well-capitalized, and not under the control of government. In conclusion - the taxpayer's "investment" will be one of the biggest wastes of money history will remember.
If you think it sounds "unrealistic", it's happened before. When Sweden underwent a nearly identical bailout of its banks in 1992, the only one to survive intact was the Wallenberg SEB - one of the few banks that actively resisted any government interference.
You do make a point about the flood of money coming from China and Russia's central banks - asserting that this is what made the economy fragile. But they are continuing to buy up U.S. debt - meaning there is no unique implication as to why this was the cause of the collapse. Of course, Bernanke tightening the money supply after a few years of Greenspan's ultraloose policies would go very far in explaining it - which is in line with my analysis.
Keep in mind - I'm not defending the market participants, I'm defending the market. I am the one who is advocating that these "bad" bankers should be allowed to fail accordingly - and you are the one supporting their continued existence in the financial industry. I'm not sure how this one is being blamed on the "failure" of the markets when the markets clearly have not been allowed to function.
Seeing as you no longer choose to participate in the discussion, though, I will also cease arguing over the past (even though as the creator of this topic, I see no reason as to why this has gone "off-topic"). Instead, I will take my conclusions - and use them to make some predictions about what is going to happen - I will even apply my analysis to the events of the past few days to show how it all fits.
I've finally come to understand the tenets of the "new" plan that was hastily put in place - the "historic" bailout that Congress approved is now a memory, not only was it useless (as I said it would be), but even the Treasury Secretary himself has openly abandoned the plan (however, the new wave of powers that the Fed/Treasury have received are very alive and very well).
The "new" plan is centered around the "nationalization" of the major banks. Instead of buying up the bad mortgages, the Treasury is merely going to flood their reserves with capital. This has a few implications and presents a few new conclusions.
First - the Fed is now monetizing all forms of debt. Not just bonds or securities - but even loans themselves. This literally means that the Fed can directly act as a bank in-of-itself. This allows the Fed to inject money into the banks without overtly "creating" money, though money is created and thus inflation will continue. This is because the Fed, in the short-term, will merely wire money electronically to banks - virtual money that will float around in cyberspace for some time, until a consumer withdraws money and the bank gives them cash - newly printed cash.
Paulson sat down with the major banks and told them he was purchasing stock in all of them. This allows, once again, the Treasury/Fed to inject money (via stock purchases) without overtly creating money. But the second implication is that these banks are now under close government control - an issue I will return to shortly. In the meantime, the way the Fed is doing this is by "purchasing" bonds from the Treasury, who then use the new money given to them by the Fed to make these purchases.
The most interesting conclusion that can be seen is that now, the taxpayer will have no easy way of telling whether or not his money was spent wisely - and if he will, in fact, be "paid back" with "good investments". Previously, a consumer could merely check the value of their mortgage against the amount realized after it was purchased by the government, and then calculate the difference. But by instead injecting money directly into the reserves of the major banks, the Fed is further encouraging more loans - in short, doubling down on a bad bet.
The new plan is needed because it is doing what the free market has refused to do - that is, send new capital to these failing banks. If there was truly a way to profit from the selling-off of these non-performing mortgages - then free market actors would find the way. But with an infinite line of credit open to them, what incentives do these banks now have to efficiently liquidate their non-performing loans? The plan sets the economy up for an even greater risk of "moral hazard". One can argue the merits of "moral hazard" up until now, but at this point it's hard to argue that a new, greater risk now exists for bad decisions to be made. In 1999, when Fannie/Freddie began pursuing "subprime" loans, the risk of such a venture was mentioned - but the risk was that they would eventually be "bailed out" - not left to go bankrupt, but instead saved. To what extent this affected the next few years in the subprime market noone will ever be able to calculate - but to deny that it had an influence at all would be fairly poor judgement.
This plan will, in the short-run, cause harm to smaller, local banks. As per my analysis, the market is shifting capital away from the failing institutions and into these smaller, safer banks. This has a twofold effect: one, consumers' assets are truly safe, and two, the smaller banks are increasing their reserve capital, allowing them to make larger loans - which attracts new customers away from the failing banks. The process is allowing new competitors to enter the larger finance markets.
Rather than let this process happen, the government is throwing a wrench into the gears, by allowing the banks who made massive mistakes to continue... with an unlimited supply of credit. This means that the smaller banks - who could be gaining potential customers and increased reserves - are being prevented from growing. Aside from that, there is another potential threat - that, in order to remain competitive, these smaller banks might engage in the same type of poor loan-making activities that generate short-term profit at the expense of long-term risk. The sight of these larger banks being bailed out for their mistakes certainly does not reward the smaller banks for their patience and sound business decisions - and if their sound decisions do not reward them in the long-run with bigger market shares and thus profit, what incentive would they have to continue their less-profitable, but less risky activities?
In conclusion - the current plan will set up even small banks for a potential failure. In a free market, these banks would rise to the top because of their smart decisions, but that is not what's happening in the status quo.
Now, this is the short-term. In the long-term, I still see a massive failure of the major banks - in the form of "capital flight".
In the short-term, the big banks will gain alot of revenue - from the government, in the form of the bailouts and future programs - such as promises to guarantee future low-income home loans and other such risky ventures. Of course, the market has now learned of the true risk of such risky practices - and so capital will not return to these banks.
Instead, the capital will flow into banks that are much safer, much more well-capitalized, and not under the control of government. In conclusion - the taxpayer's "investment" will be one of the biggest wastes of money history will remember.
If you think it sounds "unrealistic", it's happened before. When Sweden underwent a nearly identical bailout of its banks in 1992, the only one to survive intact was the Wallenberg SEB - one of the few banks that actively resisted any government interference.
You do make a point about the flood of money coming from China and Russia's central banks - asserting that this is what made the economy fragile. But they are continuing to buy up U.S. debt - meaning there is no unique implication as to why this was the cause of the collapse. Of course, Bernanke tightening the money supply after a few years of Greenspan's ultraloose policies would go very far in explaining it - which is in line with my analysis.
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